


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NATIONALISM · IN · EUROPE



BY · DR. · FRANZ · BOAS · PROFES-
SOR · OF · ANTHROPOLOGY · AT
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FOREWORD

The Germanistic Society plans to issue a series of pamphlets to appear from time to time, dealing with the war in Europe and its underlying causes. The pamphlets are to serve the cause of truth, to correct misrepresentations, and to exemplify the spirit of objectivity and fair play.

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THE GERMANISTIC SOCIETY
OF CHICAGO

Louis Guenzel, Recording Secretary
332 So. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill.

Nationalism in Europe.

By

DR. FRANZ BOAS,

Professor of Anthropology at Columbia University.

In the discussions of the European war, stress has been laid, on the whole, on its economic causes, and events have been judged from an intellectualistic point of view. For obtaining a more complete insight into its meaning, it seems necessary to realize the deep emotions that sway the actions of the nations and to interpret from this point of view the events of the past and the national aspirations for the future.

During the past century the idea has developed in Europe that the people who speak the same tongue should be united in one State, and wherever this desire manifests itself it finds a ready response in our hearts. This is the basis of our sympathy with the efforts of Italy and of Germany to secure unity, and of our pity for the helpless disunion of the Poles. In order to understand the effects of this modern development it is necessary to know the relation of the distribution of languages to political boundaries.

Our map (pages 8 and 9) shows that many languages are spoken in territories that are distributed over several States, but in most cases the number of individuals who are politically separated from their brethren is relatively small. In Lorraine a small French district lies within the political boundaries of Germany, and French-speaking people live in Switzerland. A small group of French people is also included in Italian territory. The Italian-speaking people of Corsica and of parts of Savoy belong to France, and other small groups in the Italian Tyrols and in Istria are under Austrian control. A small number of Danes are incorporated in the German Empire. Greece comprises only part of the Greek-speaking people. Others live in Turkey and other States along the north and east coasts of the Aegean Sea, while, to all intents and purposes, Cyprus has been an English possession ever since 1878.

Of a different type is the dispersion of the Germans. While the main body lives in Germany, Austria includes extended German provinces; part of Switzerland is German; and German colonies are found far to the east in Russia and Hungary. Those of the Baltic provinces are probably most important.

Another group of peoples are even less unified. Servia embraces only part of all the Servians, while many others live in Austria-Hungary. Rumanians live not only in Rumania, but also in great numbers in Hungary, southeastern Russia, and northeastern Servia. The Poles, finally, are divided up between Russia, Austria, and Germany. They lost their political independence as a result of never-ending internal struggles. In the following tables the total numbers

and approximate distribution of various nationalities in some of the more important countries are given, in millions:

Numbers of the More Important Peoples of Europe About 1900.

(Expressed in Millions.)

TEUTONIC.	ROMANCE.	SLAVIC.	MISCELLANEOUS
English 39.8	French and	Russians 87.9	Celts 2.8
Germans 68.1	Catalans 44.8	Poles 14.2	Lithuanians .. 3.4
Dutch 8.8	Italians 33.8	Czechs 8.2	Greeks 3.8
Scandinavians. 10.3	Spanish and	Servians and	Albanians 1.5
	Portuguese ..18.8	Slovenes 10.1	Finns 5.9
	Rumanians ... 10.1	Bulgarians ... 3.7	Hungarians ... 8.8
			Turks 1.6
			Turko-Tartars 4.3
Total.....127.0	Total.....107.5	Total.....124.1	Total..... 32.1

INHABITANS OF VARIOUS STATES ACCORDING TO LANGUAGE.

(Expressed in Millions.)

	Russia, European and Asiatic.	Austria- Hungary.	Germany.	Ru- mania.	Servia.	Bulgaria.
	1897.	1910.	1900.	18990	1903.	1910.
Russians	83.9	3.8
Poles	7.9	4.3	3.4
Czechs	8.0
Servians	3.4	2.3	...
Bulgarians	0.2	0.1	...	3.5
Slovenians	1.2
Lithuanians and Letts...	3.1	...	0.1
Rumanians	1.1	3.0	...	5.2	0.1	0.1
Germans	1.8	11.3	51.9
Swedes	0.4
Greeks	0.2
Armenians	1.2
Miscellaneous Iranians..	0.8
Jews	5.1	0.3
Finns	5.9
Turko-Tartars	13.4	0.5
Kalmuk, Buriat	0.5
Caucasians	2.4
French	0.2
Danes	0.1
Hungarians	8.7	...	0.1
Italians	0.7

The division of the Germans, and of part of the French and Italians, shows that the desire for national unity of all those who speak the same tongue is not present everywhere. This is most notably the case in Switzerland and Belgium—the former embracing people of German, French, Italian, and Romanish (or Rhaeto-Romanic) speech; the latter consisting of the North French Walloons and the Flemish, who are closely allied to the Dutch. In these two cases the national bond is formed by political and social ideals, not by language.

LIKE LANGUAGE, LIKE ASPIRATIONS.

On the whole, however, national unity based on sameness of language has led to the development of political aspirations that have a deep emotional value, and that for this reason command the enthusiastic support of the whole nation; but, notwithstanding the wide spread of this ideal, the particular form in which it manifests itself is by no means uniform.

It appears, perhaps, in the simplest form in Italy, partly owing to the fairly close correspondence of the natural geographical limits of Italy and of Italian speech, but even here the direction of national aspirations is largely influenced by historical events. The two important obstacles that stood in the way of Italian unity were the numerous small States of the Peninsula, and Austrian domination in the north. Since every one of the small States, as well as Austria, felt its existence threatened by the popular demand for political union, the movement found no governmental support, and even the House of Savoy hesitated long before it espoused the cause of Italian unity.

The most formidable obstacle was Austrian domination in Northern Italy; and for this reason Italian nationalism has constantly retained an undertone of hostility against Austria, although the number of Italians in Austrian territory is small. On the western side France holds extensive Italian territories—Corsica and part of Savoy; but since the French have not been in the same sense as Austria an obstacle to Italian aspirations, the consciousness of French encroachment is not so strong. It is true that Mazzini never forgave the Third Republic for not restoring the French territories ceded to Napoleon in 1860; but in the popular mind the injustice of France is not felt as keenly as the long-continued oppression by Austria.

German national aspirations may well be compared with those of Italy. Here, too, the ideal developed as a popular demand opposed to governmental policies. Governmental jealousies had brought about the dismemberment of Germany, and stood in the way of national unity. After the Napoleonic conquest, the German people fought for the liberation of their country, looking forward to the re-establishment of the empire. The depression and embitterment that followed the bickerings of the Congress of Vienna, in which Metternich and Talleyrand defeated every hope of the German patriots, determined the cause of German thought during the following generations. The jealousy between Austria and Prussia and the selfishness of the numerous lesser States had prevented German union. France held German Alsace-Lorraine. Denmark continued to rule Schleswig-Holstein.

NEEDED FOR GERMAN UNITY.

Perhaps the deepest popular depression was felt in 1848 after the futile attempt of Schleswig-Holstein to tear itself away from Denmark. Thus the Danish duchies and Alsace-Lorraine became the symbols of Germany's disruption and shame; and the idea of German unity was indissolubly connected with the recovery of these territories, which had always remained related to Germany by ties of language. Their embodiment in the German Empire never appealed to Germans as aggression, but as a re-establishment of old bonds, without which German unity would have remained incomplete. In Germany the incorporation of small French and Danish speaking areas has always been felt, I believe, as a disagreeable military precaution, and has never aroused popular enthusiasm.

It is very instructive to see that the separation of German parts of Austria is not felt in the same manner by modern Germany. In

this respect a complete change of feeling has taken place. During the last hundred years the desire for union by including Austria in the modern German Empire has given way before the conviction that the problems of Germany and of Austria require a close friendship but forbid political union. In a similar way, German feeling for German Switzerland is not affected by the desire for national unity. As in the case of Italy, respect for voluntary separation dominates the desire for national unity.

There is a small group of Germans who long for the complete union of all German-speaking people, and who cannot resign themselves to the unavoidable disappearance of the German diaspora in the East; but they are confronted by the same resistance of modern governmental Germany as resisted the German patriots of the nineteenth century.

One of the difficulties of national union appears clearly in this case. During the Middle Ages German colonists extended the area of German speech over a large extent of Slavic territory. Small German centres gradually expanded until the whole country became Germanized. This process continued for a long time, but finally the economic and cultural advances of the native Slavs put an end to it, and as a result we find the numerous small isolated German communities in the midst of Slavic and Magyar territories—indications of the fossilization of German colonization. The geographical discontinuity of these colonies and of similar isolated groups of Poles, Bulgarians, Rumanians, etc., makes nationalization in the European East impossible, or, if carried through by one nation, it entails the subjection of many others.

For this reason the national sympathy with the isolated groups of Germans is expressed by the endeavor to support and maintain German speech, not by the serious desire to bring these colonies into the empire. Quite recently the attempt has been made to draw back some of the German outposts and to use them for closing up the gaps between the German communities in that part of Poland that is governed by Prussia.

It will thus be seen that the modern German ideal of national unity differs from the Italian one. It is more restricted in its application, owing to the fact that the political problems of the Germans in Switzerland and Austria are distinct from those of the German Empire, and owing to the further fact that German is spoken in isolated communities over a vast area.

RUSSIA'S NATIONALISTIC FEELING.

Russian nationalism differs fundamentally from that of either Germany or Italy. Our map shows that besides Russian a large number of other languages are spoken in the empire. In 1897 the number of Russians in Europe and Asiatic Russia together amounted to about 84,000,000, that of people speaking other languages to 44,000,000. Less than 4,000,000 Russians live outside of Russia. Almost all of these are in Austria. The national unity of the Russian-speaking people is, therefore, nearly attained.

Russia, however, is not content with this, but endeavors to bring about the Russianization of the 44,000,000 of other nationalities that


live within her boundaries. Furthermore, she demands the leadership of all the Slavic people of Eastern Europe. In 1897 there were 92,000,000 people in Russia speaking Slavic languages. In 1900 there were in Austria, including Bosnia, 23,000,000; in Germany about 3,400,000, in Servia, 2,300,000, in Bulgaria, 3,500,000. To these must be added about 1,800,000 who lived in Turkish provinces and 300,000 who lived in Montenegro. In all there are, therefore, about 34,000,000 Slavic-speaking people outside of Russia.

The relation between the various Slavic languages may be compared to that between the various Teutonic and Romance languages. The heterogeneity of the Slavic peoples is furthermore emphasized by their denominational division. Poles, Czechs, and Croatians are essentially Roman Catholics, while the eastern Slavs are Greek Catholics. The Servians particularly are divided into three distinct denominational sections—the eastern Servians being Greek Catholics, the southeastern division Mohammedans, and the Croations Roman Catholics. On account of the aggressiveness of the Greek Church, this heterogeneity is a cause of division no less serious than the differentiation of languages. It will thus be seen that Russian nationalism is not primarily directed toward national unification of the Russians, but toward unification of all the Slavic-speaking people under Russian leadership. This ideal may be compared to the Pan-Latin dreams of Napoleon, who wished to see France take the lead of all the Latin countries of Europe; or it would be analogous to the endeavor of England to unify the Scandinavians, Dutch and Germans under her protection.

On account of the great diversity of the Slavic peoples, the Pan-Slavistic ideal would seem quite artificial if it were not for the fact that the southeastern Slavs have been for a long time under the subjection of foreign nationalities. Bulgarians and Servians have been tyrannized by the Turks, and the Austrian Slavs used to be under the subjection of Germans and Magyars. The knowledge of the historical relationship between northern, western, and southern Slavs is largely the result of scientific research, which, when popularized, engendered among the Russian people the wish to free the related peoples. The fact that the Poles, another Slavic people, are held in subjection by Russians has never been felt as a contradiction to this ideal, because Pan-Slavism entails Russian leadership. The idea, which had a justification in the sympathy with oppressed peoples, has been skillfully exploited as a device to create popular enthusiasm for the subjection of all Slavic countries.

The contrast between German and Italian nationalism on the one side, and Russian Pan-Slavism on the other, is therefore very striking. The former arose against governmental opposition, and led to the unification of fairly homogeneous nations. The latter was carefully nursed by the Government, which utilized the sympathy with remotely related groups to build up an ambitious scheme for expansion of Russian political power.

The political development of the States of Eastern Europe has removed the causes that justified the Pan-Slavistic movement, which has gained such momentum, however, that it persists in its old form. Not only have the Slavs of the eastern Balkan Peninsula gained





↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
 ROMANIAN

RUSSIAN

POLISH

CZECH

SLOVENIAN

SERBIAN

BULGARIAN

SLAV.

FINN AND HUNGARIAN

TURKISH.

their political freedom, but the very nature of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has changed.

It has often been claimed that Austrian nationalism cannot exist and that the dynastic tradition is the only link that unifies the heterogeneous population of the empire. I believe nothing can be further from the truth than this statement. Although by origin Austria-Hungary comprises the possessions of the Hapsburg dynasty, a new era set in about the middle of the past century, first against the resistance of the Imperial Government, then against the wishes of the Austrian Germans—a movement that is slowly transforming the empire into a union in which the people speaking different languages possess equal rights.

This process of equalization is more marked in Austria than in Hungary. In the eastern part of the dual monarchy the Magyars are still abusing their newly acquired independence from German mastery, and oppress the other nationalities. In Austria equal rights of Germans, Poles, and Czechs have almost been attained, and we witness the gradual development of a commonwealth built up on those principles that are the foundation of Swiss liberty—a nation consisting of a number of groups of different speech but of similar social and political ideas.

ANTAGONISTIC TO PAN-SLAVISM.

It is quite obvious that in this area of relatively small linguistic units, the boundaries of which are ill-defined, free development of each is possible only in a confederation. The policy which is said to have been advocated by the murdered heir-apparent of Austria-Hungary was quite in this direction, being intended to increase the independence of the Slavic peoples of the monarchy. For these reasons Austria-Hungary appears more than any other of the European countries a nation in the making, but of high promise.

The development of national feeling in Austria-Hungary has led to an intense antagonism against Pan-Slavism. The South Slavs are separated from the North Slavs by a broad belt inhabited by Germans, Hungarians, and Rumanians. There are 11,000,000 Germans, 9,000,000 Hungarians, and 9,000,000 Rumanians in this belt, who separate the 13,000,000 southern Slavs from the 84,000,000 Russians. The consummation of Russian policy means, therefore, the strangulation of these 29,000,000 for the sake of the South Slavs, for Pan-Slavism cannot attain its object without suppressing the alien nationalities that are interposed between Russia and the Slavic parts of the Balkan Peninsula. While among the Rumanians this political problem is obscured by their hostility to the Magyars, the situation is felt as a constant menace by the Germans and Hungarians of Austria-Hungary and creates the strongest possible anti-Russian feeling.

The distribution of Rumanians in Rumania, Hungary, and Russia, and to a less extent in Servia and Bulgaria, determines their national aspirations. Only a little more than one-half of their number possess political independence; about one-third of all the Rumanians (3,000,000), live in Hungary, where they are subjected to

Magyar domination; about one-ninth (1,000,000), live in Russia. For this reason the Rumanians feel more strongly opposed to Austria-Hungary than to Russia.

The position of the Servians is peculiarly complicated. No exact figures are available for the present distribution of Servians; but in 1900, 2,300,000 lived in Servia, 3,400,000 in Austria. After the last war, the number in Servia was about 4,500,000, in Montenegro, 500,000. Many Servians are Roman Catholics, others Mohammedans; and the enmities based on religious differences are so great that the desire for political union may be more correctly termed a desire of the Greek Catholic Servians to control and subject those of other faiths.

FRENCH PROBLEMS SIMPLER.

The political union of the French Nation is much older than that of Germany and Italy, and its problems are infinitely simpler than those of Austria and Russia. What was achieved by Italy and Germany less than fifty years ago was accomplished in France in past centuries, and territorial limits and national limits coincide most happily. There are no outlying European colonies in areas of foreign speech; but the limits of French form, on the whole, continuous, unbroken lines. A few valleys in Northwestern Italy are inhabited by French-speaking people, North French or Walloon territory forms the southern half of Belgium, and about 230,000 French are located in German Lorraine.

The present aspect of French nationalism is determined by the loss of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. Before that time the Alsatian was the butt of French wit on account of his German accent and behavior. Since that time the French have accustomed themselves to look at the Alsatians as lost and cherished children, an attitude that may readily be understood, but that is necessarily antagonistic to the German feeling described before.

The insular position of Great Britain and her early unification brought it about that nationalism never assumed the form that is characteristic of Central Europe. During the period of development of modern nationalism there has never been a time when Great Britain had to work for the unification of the English-speaking people. Instead of this, we may rather observe the growth of individualization of parts of the State. The place of British nationalism is taken by the all-pervading feeling that to England belongs the mastery of the ocean and by the consciousness of the ownership of a world empire.

The statesmen of "Little England" of the past century who believed that England should be primarily concerned in her own affairs are looked down upon nowadays with unconcealed contempt. The position of England has engendered a spirit of aloofness from the rest of the world, and an unyielding, self-centred satisfaction with English ways and manners, that makes the Englishman unwilling to give up any particle of his individuality, but demands adoption of his ways by others. This basic feeling creates enmity against any people that seems to develop similar traits.

In recent years conditions have arisen in Germany that are

somewhat analogous to those that were active in the later development of the British Colonial Empire. The German people have been increasing in numbers, and, being unable to expand at home, have been compelled to seek for new fields abroad. Even if Germany has not heretofore pursued a particularly aggressive colonial policy, she has given evidence that she seeks for expansion and that she feels opposed to the continued alienation of emigrating Germans. Their cohesion with the Fatherland is greater than what it used to be; and the English feel, with ever-increasing irritation, German rivalry in all parts of the world.

It is curious that this feeling has been developing most strongly at a time when German emigration has declined on account of the improvement of the economic conditions at home. His own discomfort leads the Englishman to interpret German activities as due to aggressiveness directed against himself. In his relation to France and Russia these feelings are not so active, for the French, who are less expansive, do not come into daily rivalry with British interests in all parts of the world, and their colonial empire in Africa does not stand in the way of English activities. Russia is able to expand within her own domain and in the adjoining parts of Asia. The only other country that is situated like Germany is Japan; and we may safely predict that when Japanese commercial enterprise expands the jealousy that is now directed against Germany will manifest itself in this direction.

An appreciation of this emotional background is necessary if we wish to understand the causes that led to the present war. It ought to be clear to every one that the very fact that the same events are interpreted so differently in England, France, Germany, Austria and Russia, can be explained only when we remember that a distinctive emotional state prevails in each nation, and that it determines the mode of thought of the people. It is an obvious mistake to assume that only those who share our emotional position can think logically or are the sole possessors of higher ethical standards; for it can easily be shown that the fundamental position of each nation is largely determined by the emotional background of its national life, which, on account of its emotional power, is never subjected to careful and critical examination.

France feels the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. She is not inclined to look back to the period when she acquired these provinces by force and fraud, but bases her resentment on the fact that forty-three years ago the provinces were taken from her forcibly. In assuming this position it is convenient to utilize the anti-German feeling of a number of Alsatians and to generalize on this basis, and to claim that the whole country is anxious to revert to France. Germany remembers her intense longing for a reunited Germany of which Alsace-Lorraine formed a part, and calls "restitution" what France calls "robbery." She points with pride to the loyalty of many of the people of Alsace-Lorraine, to the adjustment of parties according to German party lines, to the breakdown of the recent attempt to revive a French national party, and she disregards the few but noisy friends of France.

The popularity of the war in Russia is clearly due to the hold

that the Pan-Slavistic idea has upon the whole people. "Protection of the South Slavs," "liberation of the Ruthenians in Austria," "union of all the Slavs," are the watchwords, which mean the dismemberment of Austria, and in part of Germany, and are intended to bring about expansion of Russian territories to the Bosphorus, to the Aegean Sea, and along the Baltic Sea. The desires of the Russian people are all directed to action in areas lying outside of the territorial limits of their country.

It is a war for the expansion of Russian influence and Russian power, carried along by the fiction that Russia is to "liberate" by means of annexation and subjugation those Slavic people that are beginning to enjoy their independence. Incidentally, this aggression is directed against all the Hungarians and Germans who separate North and South Slavs, and against all those who are wedged into Slavic territory, like the Germans of Silesia and Prussia.

Hemmed in between Russian aggressiveness, and French desire for revenge, Germany has been in a state of constant worry, which has been much aggravated by the entry of Great Britain into the Triple Entente, and which is reflected in the nervous inconsistency that in recent years has characterized German policies. The emotional background of Germany's recent actions appears to be based on the fear of a combination of powerful enemies.

Russian and South Slavic aggressiveness create still greater tension in Austria-Hungary, because the realization of any of the Pan-Slavistic policies would threaten the very existence of the empire, and at the same time seal the death warrant of the Austrian Germans and of the Hungarians, not to speak of the fate of the West Slavic Czechs and Poles. Years of Servian agitation, which, according to the conviction of Austria, was continually fomented by Russia, had created intense hostility. When it finally led to the murder of the heir apparent of Austria-Hungary, a condition was created in which the natural reaction consisted in immediate drastic measures against Servia.

HOW AMERICANS REASON.

All these matters do not affect us deeply. Americans are not overfamiliar with European conditions, and at present we are judging by cold reasoning actions that were dictated by strong emotional causes. Perhaps Austria might have had satisfaction by means of diplomatic negotiations. The probability for success was not very great, but Austria was not willing to wait. The mental conditions that had been created would not brook foreign mediation. Since we are not wedged in like Germany, we make light of the dangers that have excited Germans for many years, and that have determined German activities. We like to imagine that all her neighbors are quiet and friendly; and we imagine, therefore, that the careful measures taken by Germany to protect herself must have other motives.

A clearer understanding of the causes of the war than are based on mere intellectualistic considerations may be obtained by recalling the incidents preceding our war with Spain. When the Maine was blown up in the harbor of Havana, sixteen years ago, the cry "Remember the Maine!" inflamed the passions of our people; it deafened us to reason and stirred up a dormant warlike spirit. Events

took their course. A weak Executive, without courage to withstand the popular agitation, failed to impress the nation with those facts and considerations that might have made peace possible, and we were precipitated into the Spanish war, that might and should have been avoided.

At that time a large part of Europe stood aghast at the spectacle presented by our nation, which, apparently peaceful, developed suddenly an uncalled-for ardent longing for war. It was not a European man-of-war that had been destroyed, and the passions of the European nations were not aroused. Europe felt that a cause for the sudden leaping forth of the warlike spirit had to be found; and by calm reasoning the European public reached the conclusion that the war was due to the Pan-American aspirations of the United States, that had utilized a pretext to extend its domination in America. The jealousy with which the Monroe Doctrine is observed appeared as ample and fundamental proof of the policies of the United States. In the eyes of many European nations the United States stood condemned of warlike aggression, utterly opposed to the pacific spirit that was manifested on the European Continent. Americans who happened to visit Europe at that time tried in vain to explain the unselfish motives that swayed the majority of our people, and at the end of the war it was difficult to argue against the plain facts with which the Europeans confronted us—the annexation of Porto Rico and of the Philippines and our domination of the foreign policy of Cuba. The extension of American dominion outside of the American Continent seemed to indicate clearly that the United States not only meant to keep European powers out of America, but that she also meant to invade the Old World.

WHEN EUROPE MISJUDGED US.

We misjudge the motives of the European powers at war in the same manner as our own motives were misjudged sixteen years ago. It has been claimed that the so-called "calmness" of our present judgment shows that the character of our nation has changed completely. Do we honestly consider ourselves now so righteous that we justly claim to be the representatives of peace? Were not we sixteen years ago the offenders, the European nations the defenders, of the principles of peace?

I think if we could bring ourselves to recognize the bearing of these facts, we should not be quite so ready as we are to condemn actions that spring from deep emotions, merely because we do not participate in them, and substitute arbitrarily selfish motives for acts dictated by deep-seated feelings.

This should remind us that in the present stage of our civilization all countries, including ourselves, react in the same way to the same type of provocation. Up to the present time the basis of all our national aspirations is not an intellectual, but an emotional one, and we should be clear in regard to the emotional values underlying the thoughts of the members of each nation.

On account of the remoteness of our position, we represent at the moment the intellectualists, which does not preclude that, under given conditions, we may again be swayed by emotions and be con-

demned by those who are not interested in our quarrels or in our struggle for self-preservation.

In this respect I differ fundamentally from the views expressed by ex-President Eliot. While in full sympathy with his intellectual point of view, and desirous, as he is, for peace, I do not believe that the ideals which he eloquently defends are realized in any part of the world, certainly not among ourselves. The American Nation does not consist principally of intellectuals, but is swayed by passions, perhaps even more than some of the calmer European countries. We are not on the intellectual level that would enable the whole people to accept Carl Schurz's apt paraphrase of a much mis-used quotation, "My country! If right, to keep right; if wrong, to set right." Our people, the House of Representatives, the Senate, are swayed by passions and prejudices. Decisions depend upon the manipulation of information and upon administrative suggestions colored by personal bias, which in times of excitement lead to precipitate action. Or will any one maintain that our foreign policy is not largely determined by the President and his advisers? Even last Summer, what did our country know about conditions in Mexico? And still we "stood by the President."

It is not always that we have the good fortune to have our policies shaped by a President of high ideals of right and wrong, as we have now. Another one might have led us from the occupation of Vera Cruz into the throes of a war, and still we should have "stood by him." Or does any one pretend to believe that British foreign policy is made by the people? Did the people demand the division of Persia, the occupation of Cyprus, Egypt, and so on?

There is no country in which the foreign policy does not lie in the hands of a few, who can obtain, at least temporarily, popular approval of their policies by the appropriate manipulation of information.

Other aspects of our public life demonstrate also that the intellectualistic position which we take in the present conflict is not due to habits of clearer thought, but to a lack of participation in its emotional causes. Our whole patriotic oratory, much of our art, and more of our education, are directed to arouse patriotic passions. We do not praise heroic devotion to ideals that our intellect supports, but heroic deeds; we flatter our nation by making her believe in her superiority over all others; we nourish the conviction that the promotion of our own interests at the expense of other nations is a laudable policy. Our greatness, our excellence, are the themes on which imagination is fed, and from which develops the emotional international attitude that is still common to mankind.

We shall not learn the lesson of this war if we condemn Austria and Germany, and praise ourselves on account of our higher humanity. We should remember that we have reacted in just the same way under a similar type of provocation. We should learn that it is our duty to master the deep-lying emotional forces that are present in all nations, and that, under given conditions, assume the aspect of admirable patriotism.

